This paper considers the history of governance and speculation on US derivative markets from their emergence in the middle of the 19th century through their incursion into finance in the late 20th century. It explores the importance of derivatives' extended ancestry in agricultural markets before analyzing their entanglement with financial markets, which came much later in the 1970s and 1980s. The paper is particularly concerned with the institutional inheritance of a set of legal-regulatory boundaries that prioritized price making and the speculative trading that was necessary to produce a consistent flow of prices. This governance system for derivatives is set in contrast with the governance of securities markets, which during the 1930s became subject to more strict government oversight, particularly with regard to speculative trading. The legal boundaries between these two markets began to deteriorate in the 1970s when the Chicago derivative exchanges applied the speculative logic of agricultural derivative markets to financial instruments. The implications of this are twofold. First the paper argues that market mechanisms and market regulation are analytically inseparable, and ought to be studied as such. Second, employing this approach, the paper argues that US financial derivative markets are originally 'derivative' not of New York and the finance sector, but of Chicago and the agricultural sector.
Introduction
The critical legal scholar, Lynn Stout, argues that the 2008 financial crisis was "caused, first and foremost, by changes in the law" (2011: 3), suggesting that "all significant markets, including financial markets, must be built on some underlying legal infrastructure" (37). Stout's underlying argument is one I believe critical social scientists ought to take more seriously: the law and other "rule regimes" (Brenner, et al. 2010 ) are fundamentally constitutive of both markets and market * This version was accepted for publication, but was significantly edited in the proofing process.
failures. In geography, the scholarship on regulation is largely written by scholars interested in the neoliberal state, and it tends to assume an operational separation of markets from regulation.
Furthermore, the sub-filed of legal geography, while expanding in scope (Delaney 2014), has mostly ignored markets and market regulation. I argue that a close analysis of market "legalities" (Pollard and Samers 2013) demonstrates that in effect markets and regulations are often one and the same. As such, this article attempts to articulate a "geography of marketization" (Boeckler and Berndt 2012) by focusing on the legal-regulatory structures that "define" markets (Christophers forthcoming) .
Interrogating the constitutive relationship between markets and legal-regulatory structures is particularly important in light of recent work on the historical evolution and contradictions of (neo)liberal philosophy with regard to markets (Peck 2010 , Harcourt 2011 , Dardot and Laval 2013 .
It is increasingly clear that our current market society is in part the result of a long history of intellectual work that has framed the active construction and maintenance-or regulation-of market mechanisms by the state as outside the sphere of legitimate political contestation. This article contributes to the project of correcting that flawed perspective.
Law and regulation have been particularly important to the development of financial derivative markets. Originally designed in Chicago in the late 19 th Century to coordinate geographically dispersed agricultural markets, in the late 20th Century the same legal and regulatory infrastructure became a constitutive element in the construction of a highly speculative U.S. financial market system. In agricultural commerce, law and government regulation were often explicitly employed to produce an "efficient" price mechanism, and in that regard speculation was accepted as a necessary evil, if not encouraged as virtuous. On the other hand, during the 1930s the U.S.
government took a relatively adversarial stance towards the financial sector, particularly towards speculative trading. In this way, the market logics of agricultural commerce, and the governance structures that those logics depended upon were bounded off from finance. In the 1970s, however, financial derivatives, or "futures" as they were then called, emerged not from the New York based financial sector, but from the Chicago-based agricultural sector. Although the commodities traded in this new market were financial, the market rules and thus the market structures were inherited directly from the distinctly speculative agricultural markets. As a result the boundary between these two market systems-a boundary that helped keep speculative finance in check-was fractured.
By analyzing the events that led to the collapse of this boundary, this article contributes to an "extended historical genealogy" (Christophers 2014a: 286) of the emergence of U.S. financial derivative markets as well as the 2008 financial collapse. In other words, I aim to help untangle the "pre-history" (Peck 2010 ) of the intense financial "deregulation" and neoliberal political maneuvers of the 1980s and 1990s as well as the massive, derivative-fueled speculative bubble of the mid-2000s.
I trace this history by focusing on the key regulatory changes mandated by the courts and the U.S.
Congress and enacted through government agencies, and privately through the U.S. derivatives exchanges and markets.
This article draws on a larger study investigating the relationship between the economic geography of Chicago and the emergence of financial derivatives as well as the uniquely speculative nature of those instruments, and how their emergence transformed the U.S. financial sector and contributed to the emergence of a crisis-prone financialzed economy (see Muellerleile 2013) . The methods employed in the larger project included 30 in depth interviews with actors involved in the development of these instruments including traders, exchange executives, derivatives lawyers, and federal regulators. I also conducted an archival and textual analysis of newspapers, trade magazines, and corporate and government reports.
Others have discussed the history of Chicago's derivative markets (cf. Tamarkin 1993 , Melamed 1996 , Falloon 1998 , Rodengen 2008 reconsider the political-economy of derivatives, particularly the importance of their speculative and price-making characteristics, both of which contributed-in their unravelling-to the crisis. Second, I privilege the geographic institutedness of the Chicago markets and their regulatory structures as a key variable in the development of a uniquely spatialized legal-regulatory-market regime.
Market and Regulation-an inseparable pair
One of Philip Mirowski's (2013) main arguments in his recent extended screed against the neoliberal thought collective is that regulation has been misunderstood by both the political right and left. Particularly on the left, what he calls "team regulation" (pg. 16) has relied on the argument that de-regulation is to blame for the 2008 crisis, and what is needed is for the state to re-regulate financial markets the way it did during the golden years of Fordism. Relying on this "dichotomy between markets and governmentality" (ibid: 16), however, masks the ways in which neoliberal governance employs state power to construct markets (Dardot and Laval 2013) , something Jamie
Peck and other critics of neoliberalism have been pointing out for years (Peck 2010) .
The imagined autonomy of regulation is not just an idiosyncrasy of neoliberal governance, however. The law, which is one of the main components of market regulation, has for centuries acquired its power and legitimacy by distinguishing itself from politics and economics (Barkan 2011 ).
This dichotomy perpetuates the myth that a "free market" can exist if some market essence could only be released from its bane: regulation. In practice, no price mechanism can exist without rules, laws, boundaries and borders (Harcourt 2011 ). Consequently, the task at hand is not to imagine the extent to which any given market is free, but how any given market is "regulated".
Despite economic geographers broad engagement with the state and state governance of economic activity (for a recent review see MacKinnon 2012), there is no coherent geographic literature on market regulation, per se. Regulation theory or the "regulation approach" (Jessop and Sum 2006) might be the one obvious framework to turn to, particularly because it emphasizes the extra-economic (i.e. political, social, institutional) constitution of the economic system. The regulation approach, however, is broadly concerned with the systemic regulation of capitalist accumulation, particularly regimes or temporary periods of accumulation (Jessop and Sum 2006) , which makes it a bit of a "blunt" methodological instrument (see Peck and Tickell 2012) . This is particularly true for analysis of what Clark (1992) called "real regulation", or in other words, specific markets and their regulatory institutions (see Jessop and Sum 2006: 222) . Nevertheless, the regulation approach broadly informs the arguments in this article, particularly in relation to my concern with the recent development of a highly speculative and crisis-prone financialized regime of
One way to analyze market regulation at a more granular level is to examine how the law and legal institutions, or what Pollard and Samers (2013) call "legalities", are entangled with market structures and price mechanisms. Geographers have argued that the law is by its very nature a spatial and material phenomenon often implicated in the construction of political and geographic boundaries (Blandy and Sibley 2010, Barkan 2011 ), but they have rarely considered markets as part of this legal-spatial nexus. David Delaney (2014) has recently reviewed the "legal constitutivity" of various institutions, but markets are barely part of the story. Brett Christophers has, however, created an opening with two recent articles considering the importance of competition law to market constitution (2014b; forthcoming). He argues that the law is crucial to the process of "market definition" or the "drawing" of necessary boundaries around particular markets to define commodities and limit competition. In this way the law is less important as an object of state sovereignty and power, and more important as a constitutive and material "device" for market construction. Riles (2011) provides another glimpse of what this sort of work might look like in her analysis of the emergence of "global private law" which is used by international financial traders to manage their derivative trades which largely exist outside of the sphere of influence of any nationstate government. For Riles, it is the mundane and technical practices of the operation of the market (e.g. ticking boxes on paper forms), not a state or a sovereign, which constitute the regulatory law and thus the space of the global swaps market.
Considering regulatory legalities (boundaries) this way-as a technical practice or procedure, or as a performance of knowledge-largely decontextualized from state power, makes it easy to imagine the mobility of those legalities since they are theorized as relatively disentangled from socioterritorial context. There is not room here to properly engage the intersection of my arguments with the policy mobility literature (see Peck 2011) , but by theorizing regulatory legalities as an integral and necessary part of markets as opposed to separate and outside of markets, we ought to be able to study the mobility of market mechanisms by studying the mobility of market regulation.
The challenge with imagining regulation as something technical and mobile, or as a system of knowledge, is that the approach tends to silence the historic and geographic entanglements of laws and regulations, particularly as they are embedded in institutions and places (Clark 1992 , Pollard and Samers 2013 , Muellerleile 2013 . It furthermore risks reinvigorating the argument that law is autonomous from political and economic context. This is of particular concern in the matter of financial regulation where the laws and legal-regulatory institutions have layered and path-dependent histories that matter for understanding markets in the present (Konings 2011) . In other words, regardless of new technologies or path creating innovations in finance, geographic origins and path dependencies of market regulatory institutions influence how they play out in the contemporary economic environment. Government regulatory agencies in particular are products of "inherited institutional landscapes" (Brenner, et al. 2010: 184) , many of them in the U.S. going back 80 or more years. One of the reasons this history must be unearthed is that many of the boundaries around and between financial markets, despite their oft-perceived naturalness, are products of a highly contingent political history. Reframing the financial system in this light is one necessary step in the larger project of "re-politicizing" (DeGoede 2005) the power of financial markets.
The Geography of Grain Prices
The legal boundaries around financial derivatives markets can only be properly understood in light of their historical entanglement with U.S. grain commerce, which has been centered in Chicago since the 1850s. And yet, prior to the 1970s, the trading of derivatives in the U.S. was quite distinct from trading in the financial sector. The trading of derivatives or what were called "futures", was embedded in the trading of "commodities" or bulk agricultural goods, the most common of which were grains 1 .
The production of grain commodities has always-and still is-dispersed over a vast landscape, and is unique to local soils and climates. But through the second half of the 19 th Century a sophisticated network or railroads and telegraphs emerged in the U.S. that centralized the pricing of grains in Chicago (Carey 1989) . The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) played an important role in this process by creating rules that standardized both the classification and trading of grain (Cronon 1991) . As a result of this early regulatory work, the CBOT was the first institution to develop a highly liquid market in futures contracts for grain.
Futures contracts were not historically unique to Chicago, but the volume of grain flowing through Chicago made that city's futures more consequential than ever before. Because of Despite farmers' frustration that the fruits of their labor were priced hundreds of miles away in Chicago, these prices became crucial information for farmers, grain elevators and processors, and grain traders. Furthermore, as grain commerce became more integrated with circuits of credit and capital (see Henderson 1999) , and more dependent upon risk management tools such as futures contracts, the flow of price information became a necessary prerequisite for cash crop farming (FTC 1920) . As a result, the smooth operation of the price mechanism itself became a measurement of the health of commerce in grains (Lurie 1979) , something that would be declared to be in "in the national interest" by the U.S. Congress in 1922 (Grain Futures Act 1922 .
The leaders of the CBOT realized that their futures prices were important to the commerce in grain, and they worked to establish rules and standards to prevent disruptions in the supply of grain (Cronon 1991) and thus their steady production of prices (Fabian 1999) . They also established internal exchange rules to facilitate the smooth operation of the price mechanism (Lurie 1979) , which was occasionally subject to deliberate manipulations by speculators. But the CBOT was also an association of traders-people who made their livelihoods by trading on price movements.
Speculative or "local" traders served the vital function of providing the market liquidity necessary to ensure that grain hedgers 2 could move in and out of the futures market without significantly impacting prices. Thus the CBOT vigorously defended speculation, particularly against those who sought to impose outside rules and regulations on their markets.
Speculation was, however, a controversial category of economic activity in the late 19 th and early 20 th Century. The reasons for this are complicated, and a detailed discussion is out of the scope of this article (see Fabian 1999 , Stout 1999 . But, generally speaking, speculation was assumed to divert capital from productive investment, distort prices, and morally corrupt both the speculator and society. Reflecting this, common law has generally prohibited purely speculative exchanges and markets. At a minimum, common law required potential speculators to incur the costs of transportation and storage of the goods speculated upon (Stout 1999: 712-721) , which incentivized investment in actual commerce. Since the end of the 19 th Century, however, there was an exception for trading on organized exchanges, where delivery of the commodity is at a minimum "contemplated" (Levy 2006) and the participants were subject to institutionalized trading rules (Stout 1999) . 3 In other words, the speculative market was only allowed to operate because it was bounded.
Nevertheless, the bias against speculation was particularly problematic for the CBOT. Even though an actual exchange of grain was immanent in every futures contract, the vast majority of the CBOT trades never resulted in an exchange because they were offset by opposite contracts prior to their expiration (FTC 1920) . For this reason, the CBOT was regularly accused of being little more than a gambling hall. Making matters worse for the CBOT, informal gambling parlors or "bucketshops" began to pop up all over Chicago as well as across the rural landscape anywhere there was regular access to price quotations from Chicago. In a bucketshop anyone could place a bet on the changing price of grain futures, but they were notorious for disappearing overnight when too many bets went against the house (Fabian 1999 , DeGoede 2005 .
For the CBOT, bucketshops were a double threat. First, they lured away speculative dollars that might otherwise be spent in the formal futures market. Second, and more importantly, bucketshop "trades" were pure wagers with no possibility of a connection to actual commerce or the production of grain prices. As such, they drew undesirable comparisons to CBOT trading where 95% or more of grain futures contracts were offset by opposite trades prior to expiration (Hieronymus 1977) . Consequently, the CBOT struggled to manage the contradiction between maintaining its image as a legitimate and virtuous economic institution, but at the same time leave space for its members to profit from speculation. In part it tried to accomplish this by demonizing and outlawing bucketshop gambling, which it struggled to frame as outside the boundaries of virtuous and rational commercial enterprise (Lurie 1979 , Fabian 1999 .
As both Jonathan Lurie (1979) and Ann Fabian (1999) point out, the CBOT attempted to establish a boundary around its trading by formalizing and rationalizing its operations to create the image of a formal, ordered, and rational institution. The CBOT formalized its rules and committee structure forcing its members to only trade at certain times so as to encourage the production of consistent prices, agree to arbitration in the case of disputes, and allow for fines and even expulsion from membership for breaking the rules. No doubt, what some might call a paradigmatic example of a free market was significantly framed by rules and regulations-they just happened to be controlled by the market itself as opposed to the state (Harcourt 2011) .
When grain prices collapsed after World War I, however, CBOT speculators were blamed, and pressure from farmers was too much for even the politically powerful CBOT to resist. In 1922 the U.S. Congress enacted the first federal regulation of grain trading by passing the Grain Futures Act (1922). The farm lobby and their allies in Congress pushed for a total ban on futures trading, referring to speculators as "predatory parasites" (Romano 1997: 279) , and to the CBOT as a "gambling hell" (Fabian 1999 ). On the other hand, the CBOT and other opponents of government regulation argued that speculative trading was a crucial component of grain commerce. Citing a recent study of the grain trade by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC 1920), they argued that speculation provided the liquid market that was necessary for commercial hedgers, as well as a constant flow of price information that improved the efficiency of commerce (see Romano 1997).
In the end, despite the rhetoric of many Members of Congress arguing that the legislation would limit the influence of market forces, particularly speculative price making, the Grain Futures Act had an almost opposite effect. Rather it was to control factors that would prevent the market mechanism from operating efficiently and producing accurate and consistent prices. The federal government mandated that grain futures could only be traded on federally licensed "contract exchanges", thus defining the market and limiting competition (see Christophers forthcoming 1&2).
While this did not completely eliminate bucketshop activities, it funneled speculative trading onto the CBOT. The added legitimacy of being federally licensed meant that the CBOT, despite being highly dependent on speculation, became the institutionalized, productive, and rational other to informal, unproductive, and irrational gambling (Fabian 1999 (Markham 1987 , Romano 1997 . Congress created a new federal agency, the Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA), housed in the Agriculture Department, to take over responsibility for monitoring commodity exchanges. The CEA was given a number of new mandates to monitor speculation, but they rarely took any action, choosing instead to let the market sort it out (Markham 1987) . Crucially, despite strong arguments otherwise, the commodity exchanges successfully argued in 1936 as they had for 50 years that speculation was in the economic and public benefit, and as such they were left to control their own collateral requirements.
Securities and Lawyers
The story of the federal regulation of speculation on securities markets stands in contrast to agricultural futures markets. The 1933/1934 Acts and more importantly the SEC as a nascent institution stand in contrast with the federal commodity/futures legalities. First, the top priority of the SEC became protecting the public from fraud, and fraudulent securities, not producing efficient price mechanisms. For the most part this was accomplished not by mandating changes in the way securities were traded, but in how securities were issued and marketed to the public. All public companies were compelled to follow standardized accounting procedures as well as required to produce standardized annual reports including basic financial information. This reflected the guiding principal of the SECdisclosure and transparency would protect the investing public, and in turn produce competitive markets (Khademian 1992) .
Second, the SEC took from the 1933/34 Acts a direct interest in preventing excessive speculation on stock markets (Stout 1999 , Thel 1990 ). There was widespread consensus at the time that excessive speculation caused the stock market bubble in 1927-29, the crash in Oct. 1929, and the ensuing financial and economic collapse (Federal Reserve 1984) . Unchecked speculation was therefore assumed to lead not just to personal or institutional bankruptcy, but to macro-economic trauma. For this reason FDR pushed legislation that installed collateral or "margin" limits high enough to curtail speculation on the stock exchanges (Seligman 2003: 76) . Underlying this was a different philosophy from that of the rules governing commodities/futures. In 1984 the Federal Reserve explained the difference between securities and commodities/futures margins:
The differences in margin ratios appear traceable in part to the disparate history of federal regulation and in part to the nature of the markets. The futures exchanges, free of federal regulation, have established their margin ratios to achieve but one objective: to protect individual brokers and thus assure the integrity of the marketplace. The initial margin ratios in securities and options markets, on the other hand, are in place to achieve the public policy objectives reviewed above, and protection of market integrity is seen as a beneficial by-product of these other objectives (Federal Reserve 1984: 16, emphasis added).
Third, although the agency did not infringe much on the day to day operation of the New York Stock Exchange, the SEC was granted wide leeway to establish and maintain the emerging federal securities laws as it related to securities issuance, investment banking, and corporate governance.
From the outset, the agency accomplished this by employing mostly lawyers. As many have argued (cf. Khademian 1992) a prosecutorial culture and combatant attitude toward "the street" emerged at the SEC. This was connected to a deep commitment to the principals of customer protection. To the extent that the SEC was concerned with efficient markets and efficient distribution of capital, which it was, these concerns were translated through the SEC's top priority: employing the law to ensure a transparent investment environment for the public.
From the establishment of the SEC, it was an agency that the Chicago futures exchanges wanted to keep at arm's length. It was a principal of the commodities/futures business that producing prices was the basis of their enterprise, and this depended on the kind of speculation that the SEC and the common law tradition were fundamentally suspicious of. Fortunately for the Chicagoans there was a clear legal boundary between securities and commodities trading, but it would not last forever.
The Limits of the Agricultural Commodity
One must skip forward 30 to 40 years to identify the contemporary implications of these boundaries around speculation. In the early and mid-1970s the Chicago exchanges began to apply their institutional expertise in agricultural futures to financial instruments that were produced not across the vast U.S. rural landscapes, but in dense urban spaces, particularly New York. Seeing this, Working with the SEC, however, was painstaking for the CBOT not least because of the ongoing skepticism of the SEC over the dangers of speculation and its status as gambling. Eventually, the SEC did allow the contracts to start trading in 1973, but the new options were broadly defined within the realm of securities law and therefore more strictly controlled than commodities/futures.
In particular, the securities options had high collateral requirements, and at first were only available as options on upward market movements, not downward movements reflecting another longtime SEC bias against short selling, which was associated with speculation (Stout 1999) . In other words, even though the SEC allowed option contracts, it remained true to its mission of keeping speculation to a minimum.
Furthermore, by the early 1970s, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which for all of its 50+ year history was the second exchange in Chicago, had also branched out into new products.
Crawling out of its "agricultural market cradle" (Melamed 1996: 313), the CME used its expertise in contract design and promotion to convince agricultural traders to trade a new contract on foreign currencies beginning in May of 1972. It was not all serendipity that the contract began trading right as the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system was breaking apart following U.S President Nixon's decision to end U.S. dollar/gold convertibility in August of 1971. In a fascinating story on its own, the CME, with the assistance of Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago Economics 5 Chicago Board of Trade Annual Report, 1972, page 5 Department, convinced key members of the Nixon Administration and the Federal Reserve, that no new federal regulation was necessary for these contracts (see Melamed 1996) . At the same time, the CBOT was working hard to develop the first interest rate futures contract on home mortgage securities (GNMA or "Ginnie Mae" securities). It seemed very possible, however, that a GNMA futures contract might be defined not as a commodity/future, but as a security which would have summoned the SEC yet again (Falloon 1998: 238-40).
Redefining commodities-redefining boundaries
There is a wide range of reasons why the U.S. Congress became concerned with overhauling federal commodities regulation in 1973. There is not space to explain them all here, but in the face of new hybrid instruments that crossed the established boundaries between securities and commodities/futures, the existing system became incoherent and contradictory. Not least the commodities/futures business was in an "explosive growth stage" (Gold 1972: 11) . This was fueled in part by agressive marketing campaigns by the Chicago exchanges who ran clever advertisements in newspapers, Commodities Magazine, and even Chicago-based Playboy (Rodengen 2008: 50) encouraging individual and institutional speculators to play the markets in Chicago instead of New 6 Comparisons of dollar value are deceiving as futures contracts are measured by the value of the underlying commodities that would be traded if the contract expired, but at least 95% of the time, they are offset before expiration. This explains the reference that is common today of US$600 to 700 trillion in outstanding derivatives contracts, which is ~10x global GDP. Yet, the federal agency with presumed jurisdiction over this highly speculative industry was considered by many to be inept. The CEA was perceived to be lacking expertise, a sufficient staff and budget, and the will to act in the face of commodities fraud or market corners, which were still occasionally happening (Des Moines Register 1973). They were accused by many of being "captured" 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 . Some blamed speculation on the futures markets speculation for food price volatility, and many were frustrated with the CEA for not intervening.
Moreover, some members of the commodities/futures industry favored a new regulatory framework to provide more robust legitimacy and an alternative to the skeptical SEC for the nascent financial futures markets. Furthermore, a shadowy off-exchange industry for options controls on commodity futures had developed in the late 1960s and grown tremendously into the early 70s.
Many of these were based on London-based commodity prices
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. In what became known as the "London Options" market, U.S. commodity brokerage firms marketed these highly speculative contracts to customers across the U.S. The trouble was some of these firms used high pressure On the other hand, a number of changes made to the jurisdiction of the agency were revolutionary in opening up opportunities for the commodities/futures business to cross the legal boundary into securities business. The Chicago exchanges heavily influenced the legislative process and as a result successfully inserted two key rules that institutionalized speculative trading on a much larger set of instruments. First, in a cunning stroke that reverberates today, the Chicagoans inserted a phrase in the legislation that changed the definition of a "commodity" from the 15 or so agricultural products enumerated in the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act, to "all other goods and articles…and all services, rights and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt" (Commodity Exchange Act 1974). Immediately upon passage, anything traded as part of a futures contract on a contract exchange was defined as a "commodity". In one fell swoop the definitions of both commodities and futures were transformed, and made largely self-referential to the market itself. Richard Sandor, a key innovator of the first interest rate futures contracts, and today an active champion for derivatives markets for things like carbon (see Sandor 2012) , explained the importance of the 1974 change this way:
The evolution of derivatives has been fast and furious, and it has redefined financial markets.
To fully appreciate the extent of change, consider that in the early half of this century, commodities were defined as primary, sortable and bulk goods such as grains or precious metals….When a number of us were working on the act that resulted in the formation of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, we ultimately persuaded legislators that a commodity ought to be defined as anything tangible or intangible for future delivery. other agency could impose collateral limits on the commodities markets. The CFTC only had authority to do this during "market emergencies", and they never used this power. Suddenly the legal boundaries limiting financial speculation established in the 1930s were under threat, and this was exacerbated by the market realities of futures: they could not exist without speculators, something that was repeatedly confirmed to me in interviews with industry experts.
Institutional inheritances at the CFTC
The CFTC had a challenging first few years. The changes mandated by Congress came into effect in April 1975, six months after the law passed, but the commissioners were only confirmed by the Senate six days before the CFTC was to begin operating. The commissioners needed to hire 136 "high priority professional and non-professional staff" 10 , although some of them came from the defunct CEA. Office space had to be procured, not only in Washington, D.C., but also in the largest field office in Chicago where the CEA was renting space from the CBOT
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. The new agency was also rife with infighting. The former CEA staff, feeling that newcomers were "outsiders" attempting to impose new policy, fought with the new hires. The newly hired lawyers in the general counsel's office struggled for autonomy from the rest of the agency and commission (personal economically valuable as price mechanisms by the federal government regardless how dependent they were on highly leveraged speculative trading.
Nevertheless, the new agency was larger than the CEA, and now being an independent regulator, separate from the Department of Agriculture, became more visible in Washington, D.C.
Over the next few years the agency would struggle to establish itself, but it did become a formal institution with codified structures, rules, norms, and an organizational culture. Two key characteristics of the CFTC help explain its relationship to speculation during these formative years.
First, unlike the SEC that closely monitored its reputation as independent from the securities industry as well as elected politicians, the CFTC was from the start seen as a partner with the commodities markets. The revolving door between the CFTC and the Chicago exchanges was extensive, with both senior level and staff level officials moving between the Chicago-based industry and the Washington D.C.-based regulators. The first Chief Economist of the CFTC, Mark Powers, came from the CME where he had designed many of the first financial futures contracts, a move that Leo Melamed, a former CME chairman, called "an insurance policy to keep the CFTC on track" and "only the beginning of a pipeline that would deliver talent from the futures industry to government" (Melamed 1996: 222) . Beverly Splane, who coordinated the nomination of the first CFTC commissioners for the Ford White House was appointed as the first Executive Director the CFTC, and nine months later hired by the CME as Executive Vice President (Melamed 1996) .
There are many other examples. This did not mean the exchanges got everything they wanted, but when they phoned the CFTC, they usually found a friend at the other end of the line. Contrast this with the SEC-securities industry relationship where there was more of a brick wall between the two than a revolving door.
The second important aspect of the relationship between the CFTC and the Chicago exchanges has to do with the rhetoric of expertise. Just as the derivatives markets are today, the commodities/futures markets were discursively constructed as intensely complicated and nearly impossible to understand for the average layperson, which included virtually all Members of Congress. The dominant discourse suggested that commodities/futures markets were mainly employed by professional and sophisticated patrons who used the markets to hedge (or insure) their day to day business involving the underlying commodity. This meant that commodities/futures markets were never considered "public" in the same way that securities markets were. The CBOT and the CME spent a lot of time educating the CFTC 12 , the Congress, and the public, how their markets worked, what the benefits of risk management were, and how speculators were crucial to reproducing the market conditions necessary to lubricate the gears of commerce, which now included the "commerce" of finance.
The expertise of the SEC was considered differently. From the perspective of the Chicagoans, the staff of the SEC was overburdened by legalistic "red tape", if not tainted by an obsession with protecting the public. Many of my interviewees discussed the differences between the SEC and the CFTC. One common thread was that the SEC was focused on customer protection, while the CFTC was focused on "market integrity". Another was that the SEC was generally focused on laws, while the CFTC was generally focused on economics, leaving the "laws"
to the commodity/futures exchanges. Susan Phillips, who earned a Ph.D. in finance in 1973 and worked at the SEC in the mid-1970s and was later both a commissioner and Chairwoman of the CFTC, described the differences between the agencies this way:
In fact, I was the first economic fellow at the SEC…one of the things I did while I was at the SEC-I spent a lot of time just explaining to the lawyers how competition worked and how markets work. They don't think that way.
[…] It has to do with customer protection on the securities side. It's integrity of the markets on the commodities side…It's market protection, not customer protection (personal interview 9-19-12).
These differences were more than a matter of bureaucratic culture. They translated into different market rules, and increasingly the rules that supported the virtues of the commodities/futures market were encroaching on the financial markets.
Jurisdictional conflict
It was only months after the establishment of the CFTC when the SEC realized how far the CFTC might encroach on their assumed regulatory jurisdiction as a result of the new definition of commodity/futures. The definitions were, as one prominent derivatives lawyer said to me, "politically arbitrary" (personal interview 2-26-13). These politically constructed boundaries, coupled with the continued innovation of new financial futures in Chicago, translated into a serious concern for the SEC, who saw both an infringement on their regulatory jurisdiction, as well as potential threats to the stability of the securities markets.
The first inter-agency argument was over futures contracts on securitized mortgage securities issued by the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). The SEC argued that GNMA certificates were securities, and thus futures contracts on those securities were also potentially securities, and therefore ought to be regulated by the SEC and subject to strict limits on speculation.
The staffs of the two agencies fought back and forth, but the statute passed by Congress in 1974 was clear-the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction. The CFTC approved the contract, and it began trading at the CBOT in October of 1975. The staff of the SEC was frustrated (Johnson 1976 , Markham 1987 , but the CBOT with the help of a new federal agency had constructed the first contract that would allow hedging and speculating on interest rates.
Two things are remarkable about the GNMA futures contract, which even though it only lasted 12 years, was initially hugely successful-it traded ~20,000 contracts in 1975, ~100,000 in 1978, and 2.3 million in 1981, but went downhill from there (see footnote 7). First, the people that designed the contract for the CBOT relied heavily on their knowledge of agricultural contracts to figure out how to rate, grade, categorize, and standardize mortgages. Above all else the CBOT knew from experience that they would need speculators to trade the futures if they wanted the market to survive. This assumption that speculators were a necessary part of the market was taken for granted at the CFTC, but would have been heavily scrutinized at the SEC. Second, the success of the GNMA contract taught the staff of the CBOT, but also the CME how to build interest rate contracts. And build them they did. Over the next few years the CBOT constructed contracts on Treasury Bonds, commercial paper, and municipal bonds.
The new interest rate contracts had an immediate effect on the U.S. economy. Since 1970 a number of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") officials had been working to develop a futures market in mortgages because they thought it would fuel the development of a secondary market in mortgages, something they believed would lower the cost of borrowing and thus increase the availability of loans for potential home buyers (Falloon 1998 , Sandor 2012 ). In the mid-1970s the mortgage market was raising as much capital per year as the New York Stock
Exchange was for corporations (Falloon 1998) . In other words, mortgages, which were still largely "fixed", or constituted by localized credit relations between small banks and borrowers, were a potentially enormous capital market waiting to be liquefied or opened up to investors across the U.S. and the world (Gotham 2009 ). The GNMA futures market helped facilitate this process by providing commercial home builders, mortgage banks, and anyone else in or out of the housing industry the opportunity to hedge or buy insurance on changing interest rates. The Chicagoans continued to develop new markets, promote speculation, and rake in profits, all the while leaving New York financiers scratching their heads wondering how they had missed the financial futures boat, and what they could do to compete with Chicago. Eventually in the 1990s the New Yorkers would catch up and far outpace the Chicagoans in their development of "over-thecounter" or off-exchange derivatives but that is a story best left for another article.
All the while, between 1975 and 1987 the Chicago commodity/futures business was transformed from one almost exclusively focused on producing prices for food and raw material processors and producers, to one mostly focused on financial products and financial markets. By the late 1980s potential financial speculators no longer found any meaningful limits on the leverage they could create in financial markets something the 1933/1934 Acts were designed to prevent.
While the margin limits in the securities markets remained around 50% of an initial purchase, they remained around 5-10% in the commodities/futures markets. As a result the volumes of the new financial futures contracts increased at an exponential pace.
When the innovation of financial derivatives exploded in the late 1970s and 1980s, the rules and boundaries around these markets were already set from legislation passed in 1975, if not 1936 or 1922 . Regardless how much the new derivatives instruments resembled securities, or impacted mortgage, interest rate, or securities markets-which they did-they were pre-defined as commodities/futures, a legacy of their deep embeddedness in the agricultural exchange industry that constituted the relational geography of Chicago. The innovations in the commodities markets for things such as futures on corporate bonds and futures on stock market indexes meant that capital flowing through these markets directly impacted the underlying securities markets, drawing Chicago into global financial circuits the way New York had been for a hundred years. But none of this could have happened without the rules that governed speculation in these markets, something the Chicagoans had worked for a century to perfect.
Conclusion
There is no direct path from the 1970s to the 2008 financial crisis, but during the 1980s and 1990s the speculative nature of Chicago style derivatives trading would transform Wall Street, in large part by importing the rule regime that was originally developed to produce prices for grain.
Thus, the story of the development of speculative financial derivatives markets in the U.S. in the late 20 th Century is largely the story of constructing legalities that prioritized the production of prices and set boundaries to eliminate factors-including other laws and rules-that could threaten the continued operation of those price mechanisms. It could be argued that the Chicago-based derivative exchanges, once entirely responsible to regulate themselves, "captured" the successive federal agencies responsible for oversight of derivative markets. Undoubtedly, in the 1970s the Chicago exchanges heavily influenced the redrawing of the legal boundaries around derivatives markets. As such, they successfully broke out of their agricultural boundaries and integrated finance into their speculative markets. But this is only one part of the story. Just as important is that the regulatory structures for derivatives, whether controlled by the exchanges in the 19 th Century or various government agencies throughout the 20 th Century, all functioned with the same priority: to protect the smooth functioning of the market mechanism. In other words, at least in this case, the crucial point is that regulation is not external to the market mechanism, but integral to it.
In many if not most cases, social scientists would benefit by beginning from this assumption-that a market is in no meaningful way a market without rules defining its legal, regulatory, and spatial boundaries. Starting with this assumption, the researcher is immediately forced to ask different sets of questions about the role of regulation and the state. Most importantly the researcher must ask, in what ways are laws and regulations designed to make markets work; as opposed to limiting the way they work? Social scientists must do a better job of framing markets, particularly financial markets, this way as they both participate in, and critique the ongoing efforts to "re-regulate" the global financial system post-2008.
